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Abstract. The article addresses the bias in interest rep-
resentation within the EU by examining the lobbying 
strategies of national interest organisations within 
the EU’s multilevel political system. Both our theoreti-
cal framework, which includes the determinants of a 
national interest organisation’s decision to act at the 
EU level, and the data analysis from the INTEREURO 
Multi-Level Governance Module (MLG) (www.intere-
uro.eu) reveal three main findings. Firstly, the great-
est differentiation among interest organisations (IOs) 
appears to be between those IOs from the older member 
states (Germany, the UK and the Netherlands), which 
exhibit above-average levels of activity, and those from 
the newer EU member states (Sweden, Slovenia), which 
exhibit below-average levels of activity. Secondly, the 
variations in IO activity levels are much greater from 
country to country than from one policy field to anoth-
er. Thirdly, although the IOs from all five countries in 
our study are more likely to employ media and publish-
ing strategies (information politics) than to mobilise 
their members and supporters (protest politics), we can 
still observe national patterns in their selection of strat-
egies and in the intensity of their instrumentalisation. 
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Introduction
The representation of interests in the EU political system is highly com-
plex – both in terms of the resources that interest organisations2 (IOs) can 
bring to bear on EU-level policy processes as well as in the interplay between 
the bottom-up, top-down and horizontal inputs that interest organisations 
effect in EU policymaking. Within this framework, analysts evaluating policy-
making at the EU level have often observed that there are certain biases in the 
participation of IOs. We are particularly interested in biases that potentially 
arise from the increasing variety of resources available to national interest 
organisations as well as the national contexts from which these organisations 
operate in an enlarged European Union. This aspect of interest representa-
tion in the EU remains largely unresearched (Beyers et al., 2008; Eising, 2008) 
despite the fact that the EU constantly faces a question of legitimacy  (Eriksen, 
2014), particularly with the public revelations that certain interests enjoy bet-
ter access to policymakers3 and the scandal of closed-door deals between 
policymakers and certain interest organisations – namely, big corporations.4 
Interest representativeness has not only gained additional importance 
as part of the EU legitimacy in the context of the international financial cri-
sis (Kröger, 2014; Fossum, 2016), but has also become problematised due 
to the recent wave of enlargement. A number of empirical studies from 
Western EU member states have revealed that the decision of a national 
interest group to Europeanise its lobbying strategy will depend on both 
its resources and its domestic national institutional context (Klüver, 2010; 
Beyers and Kerremans, 2012). We might expect to see an extensive gap in 
interest representation at the EU level due to the fact that the representa-
tion of interests from post-socialist EU member states tends to be weaker, 
since interest organisations (particularly NGOs) from these countries tend 
to have weaker resources (see the NGO Sustainability Index5).
2 For the argumentation in favour of using this term, see Beyers, Eising, Maloney (2008).
3 See information published by the Corporate Europe Observatory (http://corporateeurope.org/), 
Transparency International – EU integrity watch (http://www.integritywatch.eu/), Worst EU Lobby 
Awards (www.facebook.com/worstlobby/ and https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k0Tq4bTK1CQ).
4 For example, an EU investment proposal will not prevent corporate challenges to health and envi-
ronment (http://corporateeurope.org/international-trade/2016/04/eu-investment-proposal-won-t-prevent-
corporate-attacks-health-and); Trade Secrets: opponents call on national governments to reject the text 
(at http://corporateeurope.org/pressreleases/2016/04/trade-secrets-opponents-call-national-governments-
reject-text; corporateeurope.org/international-trade/2016/01/dangerous-regulatory-duet); Trade Secrets: 
who voted what (http://corporateeurope.org/power-lobbies/2016/04/trade-secrets-who-voted-what); a leak 
reveals the Commission gave inside information to the automobile lobby on new emissions tests (http://
corporateeurope.org/power-lobbies/2016/03/leak-shows-commission-giving-inside-information-car-lobby-
new-emissions-tests).
5 The 2014 report is available at https://www.usaid.gov/sites/default/files/documents/1863/
EuropeEurasia_FY2014_CSOSI_Report.pdf.
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The main contribution of our article is to shed light on lobbying by 
national interest organisations acting at the national and European levels 
in an enlarged European Union. We will also question how the broad varia-
tions in an enlarged EU may contribute to biases in interest representation 
at the EU level. As a piece of original comparative research that examines 
the differences in both western and eastern EU member states as well as the 
differences in various enlargement waves, our study is first of all a descrip-
tive comparative view of basic national patterns of interest representation 
within the EU’s multi-level political system.
Our study focuses on the involvement of IOs in the national and Euro-
pean level decision-making on EU directives. More precisely, these pro-
cesses are investigated from the perspective of the bottom-up input of 
national interest organisations into EU-level policymaking. We pay par-
ticular attention to two sets of questions on strategies adopted by interest 
organisations: (1) which strategies they adopt in terms of their selection of 
which level of government to lobby, and their choice of institution to lobby 
(i.e. whether the national executive, national parliament and/or the execu-
tive EU institutions– the European Commission and European Council, as 
well as the European Parliament); and (2) which lobbying strategies they 
adopt (i.e. which methods and techniques) to achieve their objective. 
Based on our review of the literature and analysis of the data from the 
INTEREURO Multi-Level Governance Module (MLG) (www.intereuro.eu; 
Beyers et al., 2014), we tested the following four determinants which we 
expected to shape the strategies of interest organisations: (1) the type of 
interest organisation (whether economic or non-economic); (2) the policy 
field (the empirical data on the 20 most salient legislative proposals from the 
period 2008 – 2010 covers three policy fields – (i) environment and energy, 
(ii) human rights and (iii) finances); (3) the country variations in interest 
organisations’ input into EU policymaking (data was gathered for five coun-
tries: Germany, the Netherlands, Slovenia, Sweden and the UK); and (4) the 
EU funding of interest organisations and their membership of EU umbrella 
organisations.
In the following sections we will present a brief overview of the litera-
ture in the field before turning to our detailed research questions, the data 
we used, our methods of analysing it, and our main empirical findings.
The multilevel lobbying strategies of national interest 
organisations
With the intensive development of the EU political system as a regional, 
post-national political system, a new structure of multi-level governance 
(MLG) has also emerged (Marks, 1996). Interest organisations have gained 
TEORIJA IN PRAKSA let. 53, 3/2016
608
M. HAFNER-FINK, M. NOVAK, D. FINK-HAFNER, R. EISING, D. RASCH, P. ROZBICKA
a more complex institutional opportunity structure (Princen and Keremans, 
2008), where they are faced with a variety of venues for promoting their 
interests. Indeed, some interest organisations which can afford to be active 
at the various levels of the EU political system are able to choose the best 
venue to influence EU policymaking (Mazey and Richardson, 1993; Grant, 
2000; Beyers et al., 2008; Eising, 2008). EU lobbying may not only involve 
lobbying EU-level institutions directly, but also via European umbrella 
organisations (Beyers, 2002; Greenwood, 2003).
Until now, Western scholars in particular have been interested in the fac-
tors influencing interest organisations’ activities at the various institutional 
levels and their possible combinations of activities at the various levels (i.e. 
lobbying both at the national level as well as at the EU level). The search 
for such factors has identified the following at the macro and mezzo lev-
els: institutional factors (Falkner, 2000; Eising, 2006; Beyers and Kerremans, 
2012); the distribution of powers in terms of horizontal and vertical frag-
mentation (Klüver, 2010); the embeddedness of interest organisations in 
their domestic (national) milieu (Beyers, 2002; Klüver, 2010; Beyers and 
Kerremans, 2012); policy issues and/or policy sectors (Beyers, 2002; Wal-
lace, 2005; Beyers and Kerremans, 2012); and the different modes of inter-
est representation (Schmidt, 1999; Beyers, 2002; Klüver, 2010). At the micro 
level, the following variations in IO characteristics are taken into account: an 
IO’s resources (including EU and national funding, and personnel); and the 
type of IO (whether an economic or non-economic IO) (Greenwood, 2003; 
Beyers and Kerremans, 2007; Eising, 2007; Klüver, 2010). In spite of the 
proliferation of research into the factors influencing interest organisations’ 
activities, the various findings have remained fragmented and inconclusive.
There remains a lack of insight into the adaptation of national IOs from 
post-socialist EU member states to the multi-level political system. Never-
theless, some contributions so far have highlighted the EU’s top-down 
impacts on interest group formation as well as the EU’s top-down impacts 
on national interest group activity within the framework of the national 
political system (e.g. Cellarius and Staddon, 2002; Hicks, 2004; Forest, 2006; 
Gąsior-Niemiec, 2010; Kutter and Trappmann, 2010; Stanojević, 2012; Fink-
Hafner et al., 2015). Other research has emphasised the ineffectiveness of 
taking the European route (i.e. lobbying the EU level directly) even in the 
case of economic interest organisations such as trade unions (Kusznir and 
Pleines, 2008; Landgraff and Pleines, 2015). Such research tends to focus 
on the weak capacity of interest groups from Central and East European 
EU member states to participate in EU governance (Obradovic and Pleines, 
2007). Some authors also highlight other factors, such as Central and East 
European EU member states’ satisfaction with EU policies and a subsequent 
lack of perceived need to act at the EU level (Pleines, 2010). Nevertheless, 
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the research highlights the crucial fact that limited resources (such as organi-
sational resources) and a lack of negotiating capacity hinder the ability of 
national actors from both the older and newer EU member states to influ-
ence policy at the EU level (see Perez-Solorzano Borragan, 2003; Eising, 
2004: 217). 
Although the primarily focus of our research is not national IOs from 
post-socialist EU member states, our analysis nevertheless provides some 
new insights into this subject due to our comparison of IOs from one par-
ticular post-socialist country (Slovenia) with IOs from countries which have 
not experienced socialism. Furthermore, our research is unique in that it 
simultaneously includes national interest groups from both western and 
eastern EU member states as well as national interest groups from both old 
and new EU member states and small and large EU member states which 
enables us to test the variations in national interest organisations’ engage-
ment at both the national and EU level. Consequently, our study contributes 
to the project of identifying the specific conditions under which the activi-
ties of national interest groups at the national level in various member states 
spill over to the EU level.
Research design
Our comparative research is unique in that it studies both the national 
and EU-level activities of national interest organisations from five countries 
(three older and two newer member states, which also simultaneously rep-
resent one eastern and four western member states) within the framework 
of the EU directive-making. In order to identify the differences among the 
national interest organisations in their multilevel endeavours, we opted for 
an exploratory orientation. We searched for answers to the following three 
research questions:
Q1: How do interest organisations choose their strategies in terms of the 
input venues? Here, we differentiate between the national venue, where IOs 
lobby national institutions to convey their interests up to the EU level, and 
the European venue, where IOs lobby EU institutions directly.
Q2: How do interest organisations choose their strategies in terms of lob-
bying methods and techniques?
Q3: Which factors influence interest organisations’ choices of strategies? 
We answer this question from the following hypothetical determinants that 
indicate interest representation biases in EU policymaking – based on the 
literature and as permitted by the available data:
 – the type of interest organisation (whether economic or non-economic); 
 – the policy field (the empirical data covers three policy fields: environ-
ment and energy, human rights, and finances and economy);
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 – the country variations (data on interest organisations’ input into EU pol-
icymaking was gathered for five countries: Germany, the Netherlands, 
Slovenia, Sweden and the UK);
 – the EU funding of interest organisations;
 – and their membership of EU umbrella organisations.
In order to answer these research questions we analysed the data col-
lected within the framework of the INTEREURO Multi-Level Government 
Module and we focused our analysis on the involvement of national-level 
actors in EU policymaking processes. This includes interviews conducted 
with national officials and non-state stakeholders in Germany, the Nether-
lands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Slovenia based on the 20 most sali-
ent legislative proposals during the period 2008 to 2010 (for more infor-
mation on the data collection and sampling see Beyers et al., 2014). The 
current analysis, however, is based on the data gathered from interviews 
with national interest organisations. 
The interest organisations interviewed are not representative of the full 
population of interest organisations in the countries selected; rather, they 
represent those interest organisations actually involved in EU policymaking 
on selected EU-level policy proposals. In other words, all of these IOs were 
involved in forming national positions on the selected EU-level policy pro-
posals. While some of them have pursued an exclusively national lobbying 
strategy or a combined European and national lobbying strategy, none of 
them have pursued a strategy of lobbying European political institutions to 
the exclusion of national institutions.
The research design is composed of the following stages:
1. In the first stage, we construct six composite indexes to measure lobby-
ing intensity at various venues and two indexes to measure the intensity 
with which two types of lobbying strategies were used.
2. In the second stage, we use linear regression analysis to reveal the fac-
tors determining lobbying intensity at the various venues (i.e. the levels 
of government).
3. In the third stage, we use bivariate analyses (comparison of means) to 
demonstrate variations between countries and policy fields regarding 
the ‘venue strategies’ and the types of lobbying strategies. 
Our units of analysis are the interest organisations interviewed6. Using 
6 We conducted 101 interviews with those interest organisations that were the most active on selected 
policy proposals in their particular country. In Germany 19 interviews were conducted, in Netherlands 
14, in Sweden 11, in United Kingdom 17 and in Slovenia 40 (since 5 state institutions were excluded, 35 
Slovenian IOs were ultimately included in our analysis). We acknowledge that we cannot use our research 
data from these interviews to draw generalisations about the whole population of interest organisations.
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this data, we developed two types of indexes to measure the intensity and 
the extent of lobbying strategies:
a. We formed six ‘venue strategy’ indexes for the following venues: the nati-
onal executive, the national parliament, the European Parliament, the 
European Commission, the European Council and permanent represen-
tations, and civil society. The indexes are based on data that records how 
frequently and to whom interest organisations provide information for 
the purpose of influencing the legislative outcome. To obtain this data, 
we collected answers to the following question(s): ‘The following que-
stions concern the different political institutions to which your organi-
sation may have provided information with the purpose of influencing 
the legislative outcome of the directive proposal. I will show you a list of 
different political institutions and I would like to know how regularly you 
have provided these institutions with information. Was this never, rarely, 
sometimes, frequently or very frequently?’ Answers were recorded on a 
scale of 1 to 5, however, for the purposes of our analysis the scale was 
recoded to values from 0 (never) to 4 (very frequently). The index value 
for each venue was calculated as an average value of all institutions (tar-
gets of lobbying) included in the index.
b. Based on the results of the principal component analysis and the hie-
rarchical cluster analysis, we also formed two indexes for ‘methods and 
techniques strategy’ for the following two outsider lobbying strategies: 
(i) media and publishing – ‘information politics’ (Beyers, 2004); and (ii) 
the mobilisation of members and supporters – ‘protest politics’ (Beyers, 
2004). Here we did not focus on insider lobbying strategies (access to 
policymakers) since this is covered in our first type of indexes (previous 
paragraph). (For a more detailed explanation, see the further presenta-
tion of indexes below). 
To explore the differences between interest organisations regarding the 
use of these strategies and methods we applied comparison of means and a 
multivariate regression analysis with the following possible factors: the type 
of interest organisation; the EU funding of the interest organisation; their 
membership of an EU umbrella organisation; the policy field in which they 
operate; and their country of origin (see research question Q3). 
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The key findings
The Factors Determining the Intensity of Lobbying at the Various Venues
Based on the regression analysis7 (Table 1), the key determinant of multi-
level lobbying is the interest organisation’s country of origin, i.e. whether an 
older or newer EU member state. Indeed, interest organisations from older 
EU member states (Germany, the Netherlands and the UK) are systemati-
cally more active in all venues we assessed than IOs from newer member 
states. The other factors we might have expected to have been systemati-
cally relevant, such as the finances which IOs receive from EU programmes 
and their membership of European umbrella organisations, proved not 
to be so. Rather, they were relevant only for certain particular venues. For 
instance, the characteristics of an IO (whether economic or non-economic 
IO) appear to be relevant only in relation to the IO’s interaction with civil 
society and with the European Parliament (see Table 1).
Based on this analysis the following factors are important: 
 – The factor of old/new membership is the single factor that is significant 
for IO activity at all levels.
 – The factor of old/new membership is the sole significant factor of activ-
ity at the EU level. 
 – The policy field is only significant when IO activity relates to national 
parliaments: for matters concerning rights, IOs’ targeting of national 
parliaments is higher when comparing to those active within other two 
policy fields (finance, economy and environment); while IO within the 
financial and economic policy field target national parliaments less than 
those within the other two fields (rights; environment and energy).
 – Membership of an umbrella organisation is significant in the case of 
providing information to civil society (significant at p < 0.05) and to the 
European Commission (significant at p < 0.10). More precisely, in the 
case of civil society, members provide more information than non-mem-
bers; in the case of the Commission, members provide less information 
than non-members. 
 – The type of interest organisation (namely, whether economic or non-
economic) is significant when providing information to civil society 
(significant at p < 0.05) and to the European Parliament (significant at 
p < 0.10). More precisely, in both cases (civil society and the European 
Parliament) economic interest organisations provide less information 
than non-economic interest organizations.
7 We used linear regression analysis.
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By contrast, the financing of IOs from EU programmes appears to have 
no significant effect on activity at any level.
Table 1:  THE RESULTS OF REGRESSION ANALYSIS – THE FACTORS OF 
LOBBYING INTENSITY AT THE VARIOUS VENUES (STANDARDISED 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS)
Lobbying indexes: Provision of information to the…
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old EU member ***0.374 ***0.482 ***0.498 ***0.493 ***0.511 ***0.438
Policy field
– rights 0.056 **0.220 0.070 -0.118 0.018 -0.045
– finance, economy -0.168 **-0.198 0.002 -0.093 0.015 -0.123
–  environment, 
energy
ref ref ref ref ref ref
financing from EU
programmes
0.172 -0.089 -0.141 -0.023 0.043 0.081
member of an 
umbrella 
organisation
0.065 -0.054 0.013 *-0.188 0.041 **0.220
organisation type: 
economic
0.009 -0.039 *-0.193 0.071 -0.012 **-0.214
N = 93 93 93 93 93 93
Adjusted R2 = 0.115 0.322 0.275 0.193 0.210 0.244
F = 3.001 8.280 6.805 4.660 5.084 5.960
*** p < 0.01 ** p < 0.05 * p < 0.10
Note: Shaded regression coefficients are statistically significant at the level p < 0.05
Source: own analysis based on data from INTEREURO Multi-Level Governance Module.
Venue Strategies and the Differences between Countries 
From the national point of view, only two main interest organisation 
strategies could be identified: a national strategy and a combined national 
and European strategy. The majority of interest organisations reported hav-
ing contact with national institutions. Meanwhile a sizable portion of inter-
est organisations also report having contact with EU institutions and civil 
society. However, we can observe a significant difference between the IOs 
from older and newer EU member states regarding the proportion of IOs 
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which lobby at both levels. All interest organisations from the United King-
dom reported lobbying at both levels, as well as 92.9 % from the Nether-
lands and 89.5 % from Germany. In stark contrast, only 45.5 % of IOs from 
Sweden and 31.4 % of IOs from Slovenia reported the same. 
In general, the European Parliament appears to be the most lobbied 
institution at the EU level (Table 2). This comes as some surprise given that 
the literature suggests that it is the European Commission which dominates 
EU policymaking (Greenwood, 2003). On the other hand, the European Par-
liament is a more approachable institution than the Commission due to the 
fact that it has national contact persons – MEPs (Kohler Koch and Quittkat, 
2016). Here we should note that the policy proposals included in our analy-
sis were those which were adopted with the participation of the European 
Parliament. Interest organisations differ less when deciding whether to 
adopt a national or European lobbying strategy than they do when selecting 
which institutions to target. In particular, they differ in deciding whether to 
give information to (1) the national executive and/or the national parlia-
ment and/or to (2) the European Parliament, the European Commission, the 
Council and national representations in Brussels.
Table 2:  ‘VENUE STRATEGY’ INDExES – AVERAGE VALUES FOR COUNTRIES 
(AVERAGE VALUES ON A SCALE 0–4)
Provision 
of informa-
tion to…
National 
executive 
institu-
tions
National 
parlia-
ment & 
parties 
European 
Parlia-
ment and 
EU par-
ties
European 
Commis-
sion
EU 
Council 
and/or 
perm. 
repr. 
Civil 
society
United 
Kingdom
1.167 0.902 1.136 0.673 1.368 1.779
Germany 0.912 1.211 1.413 0.322 0.632 0.500
The Nether-
lands
1.333 0.786 0.654 0.111 0.589 1.643
Sweden 0.546 0.470 0.343 0.061 0.409 0.591
Slovenia 0.767 0.143 0.046 0.038 0.136 0.579
Total 0.924 0.620 0.632 0.220 0.550 0.932
F 3.634 8.859 11.355 12.260 15.618 15.128
p 0.009 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Eta2 0.138 0.280 0.333 0.350 0.407 0.399
Source: own analysis based on data from INTEREURO Multi-Level Governance Module.
As shown in Table 2 and Figure 1, IOs from the UK stand out with an 
overall outstanding provision of information to all national and EU-level 
institutions as well as to civil society. IOs from Germany are notable for 
their above-average lobbying of their national parliament and the European 
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Parliament. Meanwhile, IOs from the Netherlands are above average in their 
lobbying of civil society and in provision of information to the national 
executive. Slovenian IOs mostly tend to provide information to their 
national government and to civil society, but even these two strategies are 
underdeveloped compared to the IOs from the other countries studied. All 
in all, the differences in activity of IOs from the different countries can be 
characterised as giants compared to dwarfs.
Figure 1: ‘ VENUE STRATEGY’ INDExES – AVERAGE VALUES FOR COUNTRIES 
(AVERAGE VALUES ON A SCALE 0–4)
Source: own analysis based on data from INTEREURO Multi-Level Governance Module
Venue Strategies and the Differences between Policy Fields
As we have already seen, our regression analysis suggests that the differ-
ences between countries are greater than the differences between policy 
fields (Table 1). The results of our bivariate analysis (a comparison of means 
and one-way analysis of variance) for the differences between countries 
(Table 2) and the differences between policy fields (Table 3) further sup-
ports the conclusion of our regression analysis. This means that the variabil-
ity among interest organisations within a country is lower than the variability 
within a policy field. Or, to put it another way, the variability among interest 
organisations from different countries active within the same policy field is 
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greater than the variability among interest organisation from the same coun-
try which are active in different policy fields. Indeed, interest organisations 
are more homogeneous within a country than within the same policy field. 
So, an interest organisation’s country of origin – rather than its policy field 
– is a more significant determinant of its venue strategy. This is particularly 
true for lobbying at the EU level (compare Table 2 and Table 3!). 
Table 3:  VENUE STRATEGY INDExES – AVERAGE VALUES FOR POLICY FIELDS 
(AVERAGE VALUES ON A SCALE 0–4)
Provision of 
information 
to…
National 
executive 
institu-
tions
National 
parlia-
ment & 
parties 
Europe-
an Parlia-
ment & 
EU par-
ties
Europe-
an Com-
mission
EU Coun-
cil and/
or perm. 
repr.
Civil 
society
rights 1.086 1.005 0.886 0.189 0.644 1.114
environment, 
energy
0.887 0.457 0.435 0.222 0.442 0.888
finance, 
economy
0.698 0.302 0.688 0.278 0.672 0.688
Total 0.924 0.620 0.632 0.220 0.550 0.932
F 2.017 7.013 2.246 0.267 1.184 1.435
p 0.139 0.001 0.111 0.766 0.311 0.243
Eta2 0.042 0.131 0.046 0.006 0.025 0.030
Source: own analysis based on data from INTEREURO Multi-Level Governance Module
As Figure 2 demonstrates, even if the country of origin is the more sig-
nificant factor, an IO’s venue strategy nevertheless also depends on its pol-
icy field. This is not surprising when we consider that policy fields do dif-
fer with regard to their institutional anatomy and policy modes  (Wallace, 
2005).
IOs active in the field of rights will typically orient their lobbying towards 
the national executive and civil society but also towards the national par-
liament and parties. IOs in the field of finance and the economy typically 
pay attention to the European Council and permanent representations, the 
national executive, civil society and the European Parliament and EU parties. 
However, compared to IOs in other fields they tend to be the least focused 
on national parliaments. IOs in the fields of environment and energy spread 
a comparable amount of information equally to the national executive and 
civil society.8 They seem to pay less attention to the European Council and 
8 The interest organisations in our sample were specifically identified based on their engagement in 
EU policymaking and– according to the literature (Beyers and Kerremans, 2007; Eising, 2008) − are there-
fore more likely to lobby at the EU venue. 
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permanent representations, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament/EU parties. 
Figure 2:  ‘VENUE STRATEGY’ INDExES –AVERAGE VALUES FOR POLICY FIELDS 
(AVERAGE VALUES ON SCALE 0–4)
Source: own analysis based on data from INTEREURO Multi-Level Governance Module
Overall, the national executives and civil society appear to be the targets 
of the most lobbying in terms of the intensity of information provision. The 
European Parliament and EU parties are the most lobbied actor at the EU 
level. 
Lobbying Methods and Techniques and the Differences between Countries
We measured the intensity and the scope of the lobbying methods and 
techniques employed across ten activities.9 Based on analysis, we can speak 
of there being two dimensions10: 
9 Answers to the following question were used: ‘How frequently did [ORGANISATION NAME] under-
take the following activities to try to affect or influence legislative outcomes? (never, rarely, sometimes, 
frequently or very frequently)’ The available answers were arranged on a scale of 1 to 5, however, for the 
purposes of our analysis the scale was recoded to values from 0 (never) to 4 (very frequently).
10 We used a principal component analysis and a hierarchical clustering analysis. Based on low com-
munalities in the principal component analysis, two variables were excluded: Hiring commercial consult-
ants and Publishing research reports and brochures.
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1. Media appearances and contacts, publishing
 – Organising press conferences or distributing press releases  
 – Participating in debates in the media (e.g. giving interviews, editorials, 
opinion letters, open forums)
 – Contacting reporters and journalists to increase media exposure
 – Publishing statements and position papers (on your own website)
2. The mobilisation of members and supporters
 – Encouraging members and supporters to lobby policymakers, to initiate 
letter-writing campaigns or petitions directed at public officials
 – Using social media to publicise your position
 – Placing advertisements in newspapers and magazines
 – Staging protest activities that involve members and supporters (strikes, 
consumer boycotts, public demonstrations)
For further analysis, we developed an index for each of the two dimen-
sions.11 Based on our analysis, interest organisations do not appear to adapt 
their lobbying strategies to the idiosyncrasies of particular institutions (the 
executive or representatives at the national and EU-level). IOs which are 
more active at a given level at any institution tend to use more varied meth-
ods and techniques. There are no systematic and relevant differences in 
terms of their targeting national executives, parliaments or European insti-
tutions. In this respect, we see the same pattern we previously observed for 
lobbying strategies, namely: IOs from older EU members more frequently 
employ various methods and techniques than IOs from newer EU members 
(see Figure 3 and Table 4).
In general, IOs – regardless of their country of origin – employ the media 
strategy considerably more frequently than the mobilisation strategy. There 
are, however, certain differences in national patterns resulting from the 
overall level of lobbying methods and the strategies employed. For instance, 
although IOs from the Netherlands also employ the media strategy more 
frequently than the mobilisation strategy, the frequency ratio is notably 
smaller compared to IOs from the other countries studied. 
11 The average value on a scale of 0 to 4 was calculated for all methods included in the index.
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Figure 3:  THE USE OF LOBBYING METHODS AND TECHNIQUES – TWO 
LOBBYING STRATEGY INDExES (MEDIA AND PUBLISHING; THE 
MOBILISATION OF MEMBERS AND SUPPORTERS) (AVERAGE VALUES 
ON A SCALE 0–4)
Source: own analysis based on data from INTEREURO Multi-Level Governance Module
Table 4: ‘LOBBYING METHOD STRATEGY’ INDExES 
Media and publishing Mobilisation of members, 
supporters…
United Kingdom 2.044 0.868
Germany 1.658 0.355
The Netherlands 1.500 0.696
Sweden 1.296 0.114
Slovenia 1.200 0.293
Total 1.495 0.445
F 2.297 5.371
p 0.065 0.001
Eta2 0.092 0.191
Source: own analysis based on data from INTEREURO Multi-Level Governance Module
The UK stands out when it comes to mobilisation campaigns combined 
with an above-average use of media, applying expertise and strategies that 
use position papers. Germany is notable for its above-average media orien-
tation combined with an above-average use of press conferences, the use of 
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expertise, contacting journalists and the use of position papers. The Neth-
erlands is notable for its above-average social media orientation. Sweden 
is notable for its above-average use of position papers. Slovenia is idiosyn-
cratic in that the activity levels of its interest organisations are below average 
in all respects.
Conclusions 
Our study addressed the biases of interest representation in the EU polit-
ical system from a bottom-up perspective. Our main focus was to identify 
the differences between certain EU member states in terms of the spill over 
of national IO activities to the EU level. We can summarise our main find-
ings as follows:
Firstly, interest representation is not transmitted equally from the 
national to the EU level. The main difference appears to be between the IOs 
from the older member states (Germany, the UK and the Netherlands) and 
IOs from the newer EU member states (Sweden and Slovenia). IOs from the 
older EU member states are more active at the EU level than IOs from newer 
EU member states. These findings are in line with previous country case 
studies (e.g. Lundberg and Sedelius, 2014). 
Secondly, we can observe national patterns in interest organisation strat-
egies in the scope of their targeting the national executive and the national 
parliament. The Netherlands and the UK are noteworthy for the quantity of 
information their IOs provide to their national governments; Germany and 
the UK are noteworthy for the quantity of information their IOs provide to 
their national parliaments. We can also observe national patterns in interest 
organisation strategies in terms of the scope of their targeting EU-level insti-
tutions for the provision of information: Germany and the UK are notable 
for the extent to which their IOs target the European Parliament and Euro-
pean parties, while the UK is specifically notable for the extent to which its 
IOs target the European Commission, the European Council and member 
state representations. Overall, the greatest differences evident are between 
the IOs from the UK (giants) and those from Slovenia (dwarfs).
Thirdly, of the political venues studied, civil society and national execu-
tive are the most lobbied, while at the EU level the most lobbied institution 
is the European Parliament and its political parties (except by Slovenian 
IOs). This finding is in line with research showing the European Parliament 
to be a more accessible institution for national IOs to lobby than the Com-
mission (Kohler Koch and Quittkat, 2016). The extreme orientation of Slo-
venian IOs toward the national executive suggests that further investigation 
is required. Possible explanatory factors include: the impact of resources on 
IOs; the lack of socialisation within the EU political system; and the possible 
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political and cultural residue of the socialist mindset – that it is the state that 
takes care of representing all interests.
Fourthly, we found that the differences between countries are greater than 
the differences between policy fields. Interest organisations are more homo-
geneous within a country than within the same policy field. The other factors 
proved to be significant only for certain venues. For instance, membership 
of a European umbrella organisations is a relevant factor for the provision of 
information to civil society and the European Commission; and the type of IO 
(economic or non-economic) is a significant factor in the provision of infor-
mation to civil society and the European Parliament. This supports Wallace’s 
(2005) thesis, that the institutional anatomy of a particular policy and the mode 
of an IO’s lobbying behaviour are important. We also noted that access to EU 
programme money has no effect on an IO’s selection of lobbying venue. 
Fifthly, we observed that IOs utilised two lobbying strategies and tech-
niques, namely: (1) media and publishing; and (2) the mobilisation of mem-
bers and supporters. Although IOs tend to employ media and publishing 
strategies more often than they mobilise their members, national idiosyn-
crasies do appear to be significant. As already noted – IOs from older EU 
members more frequently employ various methods and techniques than 
IOs from newer EU members. While IOs from the Netherlands are char-
acterised by a more equal instrumentalisation of both strategies (they are 
also idiosyncratic in their use of social media), IOs from the UK are notable 
for the sheer extent to which they instrumentalise both strategies. IOs from 
Sweden use position papers more often than IOs from other countries, 
while IOs from Slovenia are below average in their usage of all methods and 
techniques. The fact that EU-level policy actors receive considerably more 
information from some member states than from others clearly illustrates a 
bias in the inputs from national IOs in EU-level policymaking. 
Our findings are noteworthy for several reasons. They reveal major dif-
ferences in the national activity patterns of interest organisations in the pro-
cesses of European policymaking. This, combined with the insights into the 
overall power and influence of certain EU member states at the EU level, 
translates into major differences in the transmission and representation of 
national interests in EU policymaking and may lead to considerable biases 
if these interests are taken into account in the EU policy outputs (such as 
directives). Identifying these differences in the representation of interests 
enables us to shed light on the current questions of the EU’s democratic 
deficit. It also enables us to better understand the difficulties in transposing 
directives into national laws in member states (national interest organisa-
tions blocking the transposition of EU law). This in turn feeds back into the 
question of how legitimate and efficient EU policies are perceived to be 
across the entire European Union. 
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